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Mathematics Orality and Literacy
Abstract
To become a mathematician, a student must learn how to “do” mathematics and also how
to communicate with other mathematicians. Through a special language, both oral and written,
mathematicians share a discourse community. This community extends not only across the
boundaries of natural language, but also across centuries. My paper explores the following
question: How does a person enter the discourse community of mathematicians?
My research shows that learning mathematics parallels the learning of natural language
reading and writing. Much like learning a foreign language, learning mathematics has been
based mostly on oral tradition. The orality of mathematics learning is confirmed by my
interviews with three college math instructors. A key difference is that orality alone is not
sufficient to “do” mathematics. Literacy in the language of mathematics is necessary both to
“do” mathematics and to tell mathematical “stories.” Orality is, however, crucial to the student’s
learning process.
What Is the Language of Mathematics?
What did an early 20th century Englishman, a mid-century Hungarian, and a poor
Brahmin Indian who died in 1920 at age 32 have in common? They all spoke and wrote in the
language of mathematics. Englishman G. H. Hardy wrote one of the seminal textbooks on
number theory, Hungarian Paul Erdös published more papers than any other mathematician, and
young Indian Srinivasa Ramanujan, largely self-taught, produced highly unconventional results
with no exposure to the mathematical mainstream in Europe.
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Almost by chance, in 1913 Ramanujan sent Hardy some manuscripts about his
mathematical “discoveries.” Hardy very nearly dismissed these manuscripts because Ramanujan
was not fluent in the language of mathematics. Fortunately for both men, Hardy was able to
recognize Ramanujan’s genius and invited him to Cambridge University, where they formed a
successful collaboration until Ramanujan’s untimely death from tuberculosis. In spite of
Ramanujan’s deep mathematical insight, Hardy had to teach him “formal” mathematics, the
proper language of mathematicians (Snow 36).
Mathematicians throughout the world refer to their “Erdös number.” Having an “Erdös
number” of one means that person has co-authored a mathematical paper with Paul Erdös. An
“Erdös number” of two means co-authoring a paper with someone else who has co-authored a
paper with Erdös, and so on. The lower one’s “Erdös number” is, the more prestige one has in
the mathematical community.
To enter the discourse community of mathematicians, students must learn both a written
and a spoken language, a very specialized language that is based on many assumptions and
conventions. Robert E. Jamison explains that teaching mathematics means disclosing the rules
of the game: “the assumptions upon which the mathematical community bases its discourse”
(47). As students gain proficiency and become able to “do” mathematics, gradually they learn to
tell mathematical “stories,” that is, to communicate their results to other mathematicians (du
Sautoy 21-23). At first students tell these stories to their teachers and classmates through oral
discourse. If they are successful enough, they eventually will tell their stories through
publication of their research results. Mathematical communications thus include both orality and
literacy.
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To answer the question, “how does a person enter the discourse community of
mathematician?” we first need to determine whether mathematics truly has the characteristics of
a language. Most linguists believe that mathematics is a form of notation and not a language
(Wagner 451). Even Jamison, who champions the use of language as a mathematics teaching
tool, observes that mathematics differs from natural language in three fundamental respects
(457):
(i)

It is more precise than natural language

(ii)

It lacks emotional content

(iii)

It is nontemporal

David Wagner says that mathematics is a special kind of natural language, which linguists call
the “mathematics register” (451). The mathematics register encompasses both the written and
spoken language used in communicating mathematics.
In his comprehensive essay on mathematical musings, F. David Peat suggests that
mathematics is both more, and less, than a natural language (sec. 4). More, in the sense that it
involves nonverbal thinking:
[A] particular kind of visual and sensory motor thinking that does not seem to be
characteristic of ordinary language …. This “non-verbal” thinking … appears to involve
a form of mental activity that goes beyond anything in the domain of spoken or written
language. It could be that, at such times, mathematical thought has direct access to a
form of thinking that is much deeper and more primitive than anything available in any
natural language. This pre-linguistic mental activity may be the common source from
which both mathematics and ordinary language emerge (Sec. 4).
I question whether it could be a “common” source because few people seem to have this
type of mathematical insight. Or, perhaps, many people have it but fail to recognize it because,
as Jamison puts it, they don’t know the “rules of the game.”
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Assuming there is a form of nonverbal thinking involved in mathematical thought (at
least for some people), how does one communicate such thoughts to other mathematicians? I
think there is an analogy to emotions, which start out as feelings (e.g., apprehension, fear, anger)
rather than mental words. Sometimes we translate the feelings into words in order to
communicate them to others, but often we don’t or we can’t. Mathematicians, as a rule, are
motivated to share their mathematical thoughts with other mathematicians and will attempt to
convert the nonverbal thoughts into mathematical expression. Sometimes a mathematician will
expand upon or adapt existing notation or terms. If notation or words are lacking,
mathematicians will invent new terminology or symbols. For example, Ramanujan invented his
own mathematical terminology which he used in writing to Hardy. Marcus du Sautoy provides
an example of his own creative process, describing the “birth” of a mathematical theorem as a
“legacy” – a “bit of immortality” (24-25).
Peat says that mathematics is also less than a natural language because it lacks richness,
nuance, and ambiguity: “mathematics is a limited, technical language in which much that is of
deep human value cannot be expressed” (sec. 4). While mathematics could very well describe a
rainbow, for example, it could not describe how I feel when I see a rainbow or how the rainbow
might inspire a song or a poem. Yet, contrast Peat’s assertion that mathematics lacks ambiguity
with Mohan Ganesalingam’s observation:
Ambiguity is absolutely pervasive in both symbolic and textual mathematics, and (as
with other phenomena) there are enough examples of ambiguity which intertwine
symbolic and textual information that a unified account of textual and symbolic aspects is
necessary. The proper description of ambiguity requires so much space that we will
dedicate Chapter 4 to it, and will not discuss it further in this section, except to clear up
one possible source of misunderstanding. To wit: most ambiguity in mathematics is not
noticed by mathematicians, just as the extensive ambiguity in natural languages is
“simply not noticed by the majority of language users and this testifies to the efficiency
and robustness of their mechanisms for disambiguation” (Briscoe 22). Mathematicians’
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mechanisms for disambiguating mathematical language are comparably efficient and
robust (38).
Despite the pervasiveness of ambiguity in mathematical language, Ganesalingam claims that it
contains no “vagueness”:
[W]hile mathematical language can contain (extensive) ambiguity, it is completely free
from vagueness. All mathematical assertions are either true or false, with no middle
ground. Similarly, mathematical language is not used metaphorically, ironically or in any
similar way; the meaning of mathematical language is always its literal meaning. We can
sum up effects of this kind by saying that all of the meaning of mathematics can be
captured by (nearly) standard semantic representations to a much greater degree than is
the case with general natural language (31-32).
The key to resolving ambiguities is through the combination of the textual material with the
symbolic, “unlike anything in linguistics or computer science” (Ganesalingam 271).
Ganesalingam, a mathematician and computer scientist, describes mathematics as a “single
seamless language of which text and symbol are superficial facets” (271). This description
reminds me of W. J. T. Mitchell’s discussion of the relationship between words and images: “a
complex one of mutual translation, interpretation, illustration, and embellishment” (530).
Douglas Hofstadter makes some interesting comments about “thought” that correlate well
with Peat’s observation about how mathematics involves nonverbal thinking. In his iconic book,
Goëdel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, Hofstadter describes thought as “images and
intuitions and motivations” that “lie mingled close in the mind” (623). The concept of “thought”
involving images rather than words is similar to Peat’s description of mathematical mental
activity being a kind of visual and sensory motor thinking. Some areas of mathematics such as
geometry, integral calculus, and topology definitely have visual counterparts where images are
useful. Other areas, however, such as number theory and abstract algebra, generally don’t have
associated imagery. Perhaps these areas involve a type of nonverbal thinking that is also

Copyright 2013 © Beverly J. Orth

Orth 6
nonvisual. Mitchell’s linkage of words and images seems incomplete or inadequate in these
complex areas.
Going well beyond the linguists’ position that mathematics is a limited purpose language,
Sundar Sarukkai argues that mathematics is the closest to being a “pure” language (3669). What
does he mean by this statement? He means that it is not restricted by the physical realities of our
real world:
Mathematics is a “free” language, probably the freest language, for the simple reason that
it is not moderated by the demands of the real world. Mathematics does not have to
answer to the limitations of this world. Neither does it have the complete platonic world
before its eyes which can limit its capacity to grow. Mathematics in this sense comes
closest to a “pure” language, a language for its own sake. Applying mathematics is to
make something of it, to bring it into the orbit of other verbal languages (3669).
It is the application of mathematics to the real world that makes it resemble natural language,
which is rooted in the real world. Sarukkai also says that mathematics is really a family of
languages, rather than a single language, because there are many areas of mathematical thinking.
Some terminology and symbols are shared across many or all areas; others are more specialized.
Mathematics is not one discipline although it masquerades as one. It is composed of
many other disciplines such as real analysis, complex analysis, functional analysis,
number theory, set theory, group theory, topology and so on. Strictly speaking,
mathematics is a family of languages. Each of the languages corresponds to each of its
many disciplines …. In this, it is quite opposite to English or other verbal languages
(3668).
He expands upon this “family of languages” concept, positing that these related languages can
create richer narratives than natural language:
To me, the essence of mathematics as a language lies in its ability to proliferate
narratives in a way that verbal languages cannot …. Mathematics, seen as a collection of
many sub-languages, each with its own semantic universe, succeeds in creating very rich
narratives about mathematical entities as well as about the world whenever
correspondence between the world and mathematics is made …. (3668).
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Sarukkai’s “narratives” are like du Sautoy’s “stories,” a form of mathematical literature.
If “doing” mathematics is telling stories or narratives about mathematics, how does a person
learn to tell such stories? That is, how does he or she become literate in the language of
mathematics?
Learning the Language of Mathematics
We have seen that mathematicians and linguists agree that the language of mathematics
shares many characteristics of a natural language, and, in some respects, goes beyond natural
language in its ability to communicate narratives. Not surprisingly, the process of learning
mathematics parallels the process of learning a natural language. David Moursund relates how a
written mathematical language started with the development of natural written languages, or
what he calls “general purpose” written languages. He likens learning mathematics to learning a
foreign language (7-8). Like teaching a foreign language, math is taught using the methods of
oral tradition:
Students learn to recognize some math symbols and math words. However, many do not
learn to read math at a level that allows them to learn math by reading math. It is only
when students reach the more advanced high school math courses that there is a
significant emphasis on learn the math by reading the math book and other resource
materials (13).
Extending the analogy to learning a foreign language, Moursund says to learn math is to
become a “native math language speaker,” that is, someone who has a “high level of fluency in
reading, writing, speaking, listening, thinking, and creative problem solving in the discipline of
mathematics. A native math language speaker knows the culture of mathematicians. In short, a
native math language speaker is a mathematician” (14). We might question whether the term
“native math language speaker” is exactly appropriate, because it implies that mathematics is the
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person’s first language. “Fluency” in the language of mathematics better fits the analogy to
learning a foreign language.
Jamison, too, outlines the parallels to learning a foreign language:
It requires painstaking study of details that, once grasped, pass naturally into the routine,
just as a foreign language student must give meticulous attention to the declensions and
conjugations so that he can use them later without consciously thinking of them. The
learning tools are the same as those in a language class: writing, speaking, listening,
memorizing models and learning the history and culture (47).
People outside the math community often describe mathematics as learning how to
manipulate numbers and symbols. But symbolic expressions of mathematics are not what
mathematics is; they are shorthand for the mathematician’s thoughts. “Formulae are not ends in
themselves but derive their real importance only as vehicles for expression of deeper
mathematical thoughts” (Jamison 45).
To gain access to the discourse community of mathematicians, then, the student must
learn both the written language – a symbolic language, a special vocabulary, and special rules of
grammar – and a spoken language, which includes “math vernacular” as well as informal jargon.
The informal jargon of mathematicians “consists of expressions such as ‘conceptual proof’ and
‘intuitive.’ These communicate something about the process of doing mathematics, but do not
themselves communicate mathematics” (Wells 2). Informal jargon includes attitudes, behaviors,
myths and cognitive phenomena connected with learning and doing mathematics (Wells 4-5).
What is “math vernacular”? Jamison describes it as the “rhetorical and syntactical
structure of mathematical discourse” (47). As one example, he relates the tendency of students
to use the active voice, as in “a relates to b,” rather than standard mathematical usage of the
passive voice, as in “a is related to b.”
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Attention to this single, simple linguistic detail seems to heighten the focus on listening
[emphasis added] for proper usage and as a consequence proper understanding ….
Shallow listening leads to shallow understanding (51).
Thus, math vernacular is important not just in communicating with other mathematicians but in
understanding the mathematical concepts themselves. Note, too, the special role that “listening”
plays. Listening to how the teacher “says mathematics” is just as important as learning the
mathematical rules. The orality of mathematics, while seemingly subtle at times, is crucial to the
student’s learning process.
James W. Stigler and Ruth Baranes observe that math in the schoolroom is practiced very
differently from other subjects: math is learned by listening to the teacher “tell” it (289). They
relate a study that compared the teaching of social studies to the teaching of mathematics:
Whereas social studies in the elementary school is learned through a combination of
independent reading and group discussion, mathematics is learned by listening to the
teacher “tell” it from the front of the room. Thus, children come to believe that although
knowledge about social studies could be attained through their own reading or thinking,
knowledge of mathematics can only be received from experts, not learned from a book or
from thinking and discovery. And while statements about social studies can be evaluated
by students and teachers alike on the basis of whether or not they make sense, solutions
to mathematics problems are evaluated by the experts, who are assumed to have
privileged knowledge of what the right answer is (289).
Their observations imply that orality is more important in teaching math than other school
subjects. In fact, this conclusion is confirmed by my interviews with three college level
mathematics instructors.
I interviewed the three instructors on October 12, 2012. Dan Kalman teaches advanced
college mathematics at American University in Washington DC. Rich Zucker teaches at Irvine
Valley College, a community college in California. Peter Taborek is chair of the physics
department at University of California, Irvine, and teaches advanced mathematics to graduate
level physics students. When I asked how they teach mathematics and whether in-person
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lectures are essential, they all said that college level mathematics generally is still taught through
lectures. There was some disagreement, however, about whether the lectures are necessary.
Kalman stated that “there will always be a need for interaction in small numbers with an
expert.” While there are many opportunities to take the live teacher out of the equation, through
online delivery of lectures, the psychological element – what he calls “regimentation” – is still
very important. The teacher provides both positive and negative reinforcement. I think he is
talking about teaching math vernacular as well as the more formal elements of math literacy.
However, he did admit that “one size does not fit all,” meaning that some students learn better by
reading the text or by doing problems online, others learn better by listening to a lecture, and
some need multiple channels.
Zucker believes that the teacher is essential to keep the students engaged and motivated –
they need the “structure” of the classroom setting, similar to Kalman’s comment about
“regimentation.” Zucker has started using the “flipped” classroom approach in many of his
courses. The students view a videotaped lecture on their own, then do the homework problems
in the classroom with the instructor walking around to observe and assist. The lecture is still an
“oral” delivery even though it is electronic. What differs is that the students have the
opportunity to ask questions during the homework session rather than during the lecture.
Zucker’s view is that online learning, in general, won’t replace the mathematics classroom.
Taborek has a somewhat different opinion about the orality of learning mathematics. His
view is that in-person lectures are not really needed. However, the students like the lectures and
the social interaction of the classroom. Very possibly his opinion differs because his students are
studying graduate level mathematics with specific applications to physics, rather than more basic
college level mathematics.
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Despite the importance of orality in teaching mathematics, there is evidence that orality
alone is not sufficient to “do” mathematics. Kalman said, “To the extent that mathematics is a
language, math utterances are orthogonal to the issues of solving [math] problems.” By this he
means that what you say about a math problem is not the same as “doing” the math problem.
You can’t “do” mathematics through talking. Math literacy is needed to “do” mathematics.
In some respects, this distinction parallels the shift from an oral culture to a literate
culture that Walter Ong discusses, but to me seems more profoundly key to becoming a
mathematician. One can learn a great deal about history, for example, without reading about it.
However, Ong stresses that learning history in the pre-literate world is based on memorization
and formulaic repetition of oral stories (33-36). Learning history in a literate world operates very
differently, through the analysis of written texts, records, and archives. Moreover, Ong claims
that “literacy … is absolutely necessary for the development not only of science but also of
history, philosophy, explicative understanding of literature and of any art, and … for the
explanation of language (including oral speech) itself” (14-15). Maybe it is a matter of degree.
One can become an excellent cook without being literate, one can become a good musician
without being literate, but one cannot go beyond even basic arithmetic (counting on fingers and
toes) without being math literate.
Arthur N. Applebee elaborates on the distinction between orality and literacy, which he
calls “utterance” and “text.” The utterance is a predominantly oral version of language and is
highly context bound, while text is a predominantly written version of language that is
independent of context.
Meaning in utterances derives from context and background knowledge, while meaning
in text derives from the premises in the text itself. Truth in utterances stems from
consistency with “the wisdom of the elders,” while truth in text is more scientific, a
product of correspondence between statements and observations, whether or not the
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conclusions make “common sense.” Finally, the functions of utterance are primarily
interpersonal, while those of text are primarily logical or ideational (579).
He could well be describing mathematics utterances versus mathematics text. The “wisdom of
the elders” is the teacher lecturing. Theorems and proofs, textbooks, and the mathematician’s
“stories” are the “truth in text.”
Conclusion
G. H. Hardy observed that “the Greeks first spoke a language which modern
mathematicians understand” (81). Indeed, the famous theorems of Euclid and Pythagoras are
still considered among the most elegant of mathematical expression. The discourse community
of mathematicians is not confined to the present – it extends across the centuries.
The language of mathematics bears similarities to natural language but does have some
fundamental differences. Its precision and lack of vagueness are distinguishing features.
Surprisingly, mathematics communication is full of ambiguity, but the combination of text with
symbolic material completely disambiguates mathematical language.
Teaching math literacy parallels the teaching of natural language literacy. A key
distinction, however, is that orality is important in learning mathematics but is not sufficient to
“do” mathematics. Literacy is needed to “do” mathematics and to tell mathematical “stories.”
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